Cognitive Skepticism of Nagarjuna

[Пламен]

Discussing the article of D. K. Mohanta, Assam University.

http://www.orientalia.org/article490.html


The basic claim of the author is that

the Nagarjunian cognitive skepticism seems to be theoretically 'irrefutable' but 'psychologically incorrigible.'

I do agree that skepticism is psychologiclly "ineradicable", it is a natural attitude within the rationalistic paradigm. But are the refutations of Nagarjuna so 'irrefutable', as they seem to be? To answer this question we have to confront the Nagarjuna's arguments with the theory of hetvabhasa (argumental seemingness) and to see how easy it is to demonstrate the hetvabhasatva of the Nagarjuna's negative dialectics.

[Пламен]

Here is an example of the corrupt logic of argumentation of Nagarjuna.

Vigraha-vyavartani-karika 22:
The "being dependent nature" of existing things: that is called "emptiness."
That which has a nature of "being dependent" — of that there is a non-self-existent nature.

and the Original Sanskrit text:
yas ca pratItyabhAvo bhAvAnAM sUnyateti sA proktA |
yas pratItyabhAvo bhavati hi tasyAsvabhAvatvam || 22 ||

And it is said that sunyata is the dependent existence of all existent things.
The asvabhavatva of something is namely its dependent existence.

Here we have the perfect petitio principii, a circle in demonstration.

1. The emptines of all dharmas consists in their asvabhavatva (lack of own-being).
2. The dependent existence of all dharmas consists in their emptiness.
3. The asvabhavatva of all dharmas consists in their dependent existence.

The first proposition says that all dharmas are empty because of their lack of own-being, the last proposition claims that all dharmas are lacking own-nature because of their dependent existence, and the second proposition forms the circle by saying that all dharmas are dependently existent because of their emptiness.